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GILMER REVISITED: THE JUDICIAL EROSION OF
EMPLOYEE STATUTORY RIGHTS*
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court announced a new rule
governing individual relations between employers and employees. 1 In a
departure from its previous policy of disfavoring compelled arbitration
of statutory claims, the Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.2 that an employer could enforce an agreement to submit employee
grievances to binding arbitration. 3 Although the Court appeared to limit
its holding in Gilmer to its specific facts, lower courts have, in the few
years since the decision, greatly enlarged its teachings. 4 By expanding the
application of the Gilmer holding, post-Gilmer lower court rulings have
used Gilmer as a launching point to abrogate statutorily-created employment rights.
THE PRE-GILMER LAW OF ARBITRATION
Gilmer marked a clear transition in the law of arbitration. Prior to
Gilmer, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases,' had generally disfavored
* The author gratefully acknowledges the generous help of Los Alamos National Laboratory,
and particularly thanks James E. Mitchell, Senior Counsel, Laboratory Counsel/General Law for
his support and encouragement.
The Los Alamos National Laboratory, operated by the University of California for the United
States Department of Energy under contract W-7045-ENG-36, strongly supports academic freedom
and a researcher's right to publish; therefore, the Laboratory as an institution does not endorse
the viewpoint of a publication or guarantee its technical correctness. The views and opinions of
the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Regents of the University
of California, the United States Government, or any agency thereof.
1. This comment only addresses individual employer-employee interactions. Collective bargaining
agreements and the rules governing them, therefore, are beyond the present scope of discussion. It
is interesting to note, however, that Gilmer did not affect employees working under a collective
bargaining agreement. There the possibility to seek redress for violations of statutory rights presumably
survived intact the holding, because of the narrowness of the issue as articulated by the Court in
Gilmer. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Tran v. Tran,
54 F.3d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 1995) (stating that the line of cases exemplified in part by Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) are not diminished by the Gilmer ruling:
"There is nothing in Gilmer which appears to throw anything but favorable light upon the continuing
authority of Barrentine."). See also Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 146
(D. Conn. 1993); Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Randolph v. Cooper
Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1994). For a discussion of Barrentine's precursor, Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), see infra note 8 and accompanying text.
Because Gilmer did not overrule Alexander, the employees most affected by Gilmer and its progeny
are those who are the weakest in their bargaining power, i.e., those whom a collective bargaining
agreement does not cover, and who do not benefit from the strength of the group in their dealings
with employers. See John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The
Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37
VILL. L. REV. 113, 115 (1992). At present, only about 15% of the American workforce as a whole
is unionized, with less than 10% of private sector employees being represented by unions. NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 25, 1995. It follows that at least 85076 of working Americans are not protected
by the Alexander holding, and are vulnerable to enforced arbitration under Gilmer.
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. Id.
4. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. See also Gray, supra note I, at 119; Stuart H. Bompey &
Michael Pappas, Is There a Better Way? Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims After Gilmer, 19 EMPL. REL. L. J. 197, 201 (1993-94).
5. See Gray, supra note 1, at 123 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974);
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binding arbitration 6 as a vehicle for settling non-contractual disputes
between an employer and employee.' The most telling example of this
reluctance to enforce employer-employee arbitration of statutory claims
was Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co."
Alexander involved a grievance for unjust discharge, within the framework of a collective bargaining agreement, that resulted in compulsory
arbitration. 9 In the final stages of the grievance process and before binding

arbitration, the aggrieved employee, Harrel Alexander, raised for the first
time a claim of racial discrimination.' 0 Proceeding to arbitration, Alexander also filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission,"

and upon losing in the arbitral forum and receiving a right-to-sue notice

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2 initiated proceedings in federal court, alleging a Title VII violation. 3 The district
court responded by granting summary judgment in favor of the GardnerDenver Company, holding that rules of preclusion prevented Alexander14
from bringing his claim, already heard in binding arbitration, to court.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, basing its holding on the distinction
between relief for a claim sought through arbitration and the relief
permitted by Title VII.' 6 While the Court confirmed that judicial review

of arbitration is limited,' 7 the COurt nevertheless did not limit its review
and expressly stated that "in instituting an action under Title VII, the
employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he
is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process."'"
This distinction allowed the Court to fully examine the case. More

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984)).
6. One crucial aspect to binding arbitration is, of course, the standard of review that federal
courts will apply to the process. In binding arbitration, courts have only limited powers to vacate
or modify an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1990); Salt Lake Pressmen & Platemakers,
Local Union No. 28 v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 485 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Utah 1980); John T.
Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Sys., Inc., 623 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062
(1980).
7. Although one reading of these cases might choose to limit the Court's disfavor of arbitration
to collective bargaining cases, the fact remains that until Gilmer, commentators thought the Court
generally unreceptive to arbitration of employment disputes. See Gray, supra note 1, at 123 n.9;
Note, Statutory Rights and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Contracts of Employment, 66
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1067, 1072-73 (1993).
8. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
9. See id. at 42.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 43.
13. Id.
14. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 43.
15. Id.
16. See id.at 43.
17. Id. at 54 (citing the Steelworkers trilogy, United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960)).
18. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 54.
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important to this article, however, is the Court's choice of language when
it looked to arbitration as a vehicle for resolving employee grievances.
The Alexander Court found arbitration ill-suited to resolve Title VII
claims. 19 The Court noted that an arbitrator's authority is limited to
giving effect to the intent of the parties to the arbitration, and that an
arbitrator has no general mandate to interpret laws that might be in
conflict with the bargain between the parties. 20 Aside from discussing the
inherent tension in the arbitration of individual claims when a collective
bargaining agreement is in force, the Court also specifically commented
on the unsuitability of arbitration as a forum for the resolution of Title
of a
VII claims. 2' In short, the Court refused to allow the arbitration
22
Title VII claim to limit judicial review of the claim's merits.
GILMER V.

INTERSTA TE/JOHNSON LANE

Seventeen years later, the Court revisited the issue in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.23 and embarked on a clear departure from
its Alexander reasoning, ruling that agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims were enforceable unless Congress had precluded such waivers of

19. Because of the scope of this comment, this analysis does not include the Court's reasoning
as to its specific objections to arbitration of individual statutory claims in the collective bargaining
agreement context. Rather, the discussion here limits itself to the Court's general views on the
appropriateness of arbitration of employment discrimination claims.
20. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53.
21. See id. at 56-58. In his opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Powell devoted considerable
space to listing the comparative inadequacies of arbitration where the dispute is a Title VII claim:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the
arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the
requirements of enacted legislation. Where the collective bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure, the
tension between contractual and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a
collective-bargaining agreement contains provisions facially similar to those of Title
VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to
judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact
that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960).... On the other hand, the resolution
of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial
construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad
language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts.
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial
factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual
rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials,
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath,
Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral
are often severely limited or unavailable ....
procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration
a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal
courts.
ld.
22. See id. at 60.
23. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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judicial remedies. 24 Interstate/Johnson Lane hired Robert Gilmer as Manager of Financial Services in 1981 .25 As a condition of employment,
Interstate compelled Gilmer to register as a securities representative with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 26 In its registration application,
the NYSE had included a clause, Rule 347, whereby the applicant agreed
to submit any dispute arising out of his employment with or termination
from Interstate/Johnson Lane to binding arbitration. 27 In 1987, when
Gilmer was 62 years old, Interstate fired him. 28 Gilmer responded by
first filing a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, and then bringing his case to federal court, alleging violations
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 Interstate moved
to compel arbitration, relying on Gilmer's registration application and
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 30 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the Court ruled that Gilmer could not seek judicial relief until
a
he had arbitrated the dispute. 3
The Court outlined several grounds for its holding.3 2 First, the Court
noted the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,3 3 then stated that
Gilmer's arbitration agreement was not exempt from FAA coverage.3 4
Next, the Court declared the principle that statutory claims may be
arbitrated to be clearly established, 3 and proceeded to examine the ADEA
to determine whether Congress had expressed an intent to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims, 36 finding nothing in the act "or its legislative
history [to] preclude arbitration. ' 3 7 Third, the Court also declared that
the enforcement of binding arbitration would not undermine the role of
the EEOC, since that agency was vested with "independent authority to
investigate age discrimination. 3 8 Fourth, in keeping with its implied

24. Id. at 35.
25. Id. at 23.
26. Id.
27. Id. In essence, then, the employer is the third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 23-24. The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
30. Id. at 24. The FAA is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
31. Id. at 35. This comment only summarizes Gilmer, concentrating instead on the new directions
the decision has taken the courts. For able and complete discussions of Gilmer, see Gray, supra
note 1; Bompey & Pappas, supra note 4; Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer v. Interstate: Liberal Policy
Favoring Arbitration Trammels Policy Against Employment Discrimination, 56 ALB. L. REV. 273
(1992).
32. This comment does not attempt to retread the beaten path with respect to Gilmer, instead
it sketches out Gilmer's holding and focuses on its effects on lower courts. Accordingly, the reader
should consult other sources to explore more details of the Court's reasoning. See supra note 31.
33. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25. The Court had earlier clearly signaled this favoritism in a case
centering around commercial arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
34. The Court sidestepped the whole issue of the possibility of exemption of the arbitration
agreement from FAA coverage. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985)); Shearson/Amer. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied,
483 U.S. 1056 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
36. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
37. Id. at 26-29.
38. Id. at 28.
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presumption of arbitrability absent contrary congressional intent, the
Court asserted that the non-judicial forum did not deprive a claimant
of substantive rights. The Court reaffirmed that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum." 3 9 Finally, the Court rejected Gilmer's argument
that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process.
The Court quickly dismissed each of the arguments that Gilmer raised
in his challenge "to the adequacy of arbitration procedures." 4 Rejecting
the claim that arbitration panels could be biased, the Court also discounted
Gilmer's assertion that discovery in arbitration was more limited than in
adjudication,' further adding that even if discovery were more limited,
the expediency of arbitration compensated for any procedural loss or
opportunity for review.4 2 The Court squarely reaffirmed that arbitration
agreements are, at their core, contracts, 43 and held that even assuming
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power . . . [was] not a sufficient reason to hold
that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context. '"4 4 Yet, while continuing its deference toward the arbitration
process, the Court stopped short of finding arbitration appropriate under
all circumstances.
The Court indicated two areas where it would not uphold binding
arbitration. Fraud vitiates an agreement. 45 In addition, overwhelming
economic power, which could lead a court to revoke any contract, would
also invalidate the bargain to arbitrate. 4 While declining to find either
fraud or coercion in Gilmer's case,4 7 the Court nevertheless left open an
avenue, however slim, for employees to contest the validity of arbitration
agreements.
Although arguably Gilmer overruled Alexander sub silentio, the Gilmer
court took pains to distinguish rather than expressly overrule Alexander,
thus creating a new line of analysis for employer-employee arbitration
agreements. Alexander applied specifically to instances where an employee
was covered by a collective bargaining agreement." Because Gilmer sidestepped Alexander's reasoning, the Gilmer court could weigh in for
arbitration without upsetting stare decisis. In the process, the Court opened
the door to the use of binding arbitration in resolving statutory claims
for employees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
33-35.

Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 33 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
See id.
Id. at 33.
See generally, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1979); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
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THE POST-GILMER DECISIONS
Lower courts lost no time in extending Gilmer's holding, first to cases
with similar facts. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 49 came to the
Supreme Court at about the same time as Gilmer. There Joan Alford,
fired by Dean Witter Reynolds from her job as a stockbroker, sued for
Title VII violations. 0 Like Gilmer, Alford had executed, as a condition
of employment, an application and agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange, subject to the Exchange's Rule 347 which compelled the submission of employment disputes to arbitration." In the district court,
Dean Witter Reynolds had moved to compel arbitration, citing for support
the Supreme Court trend favoring arbitration, as exemplified by Mitsubishi.12 The trial court declined to follow this reasoning and instead
held, consistent with Alexander, that an agreement to arbitrate could not
preclude a judicial determination of Title VII claims. 3
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, relying
on Alexander and its strong language favoring the judicial resolution of
Title VII claims.14 Acknowledging that it was inclined to be influenced
by the several recent Supreme Court decisions to rule in favor of arbitration, 5 the court nevertheless looked to Alexander for guidance.16
The court's entire discussion revolved around the teachings of Alexander
and the recognition that "Alexander's rationale [w]as broad enough to
5' 7
speak to any arbitration of Title VII claims."
The Supreme Court, in a memorandum opinion, vacated the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded to the Fifth Circuit in light of
the Gilmer holding announced seven days earlier. 8 Because of Gilmer's
departure from Alexander, the Fifth Circuit, on remand, compelled arbitration of Alford's Title VII claim.5 9 In doing so, the Alford court of
appeals' decision extended the Gilmer holding beyond the ADEA to Title
VII. 6° What was unacceptable in 1974 had become reality by 1992.

49. 500 U.S. 930 (1991). Alford has several cites to its credit. Listed chronologically, they are:
712 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1989); 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990); 500 U.S. 930 (1991); 939 F.2d
229 (1991); 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).
50. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
51. Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. See Alford, 712 F. Supp. at 548.
53. Id. at 549.
54. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106-108 (5th Cir. 1990).
55. In view of its later caution concerning employer-employee arbitration, the court of appeals
here could have been more concerned with the trend in the law, rather than signaling its willingness
to rule in favor of compelling arbitration. See infra note 59.
56. Alford, 905 F.2d at 106 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1985)); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Shearson/
Amer. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
57. Alford, 905 F.2d at 106.
58. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930 (1991).
59. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). See supra note 48.
60. The court of appeals may have signified a reluctance to have its ruling set a wide precedent,
cautioning on the further extension of the Gilmer holding:
The FAA's coverage excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
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Arbitration, not adjudication, was now the preferable forum for Title
VII claims.
Where Alford began the expansion of the Gilmer holding, other courts
have followed. For example, in Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

& Smith, Inc. ,61 the Tenth Circuit heeded both Gilmer and Alford in
ruling that Title VII claims are
Merrill Lynch fired Kelli Lyn
unlawful termination due to
Metz's employment as a stock
agreement in connection with
with the National Association
Metz prevailed for procedural

subject to compulsory arbitration. 62 When
Metz, she alleged Title VII violations for
pregnancy. 63 In a now familiar pattern,
broker required her to sign an arbitration
her registration as a broker, in this case
of Securities Dealers (NASD). 64 Although
reasons in her effort to stay in court and

out of arbitration, 65 the Metz decision clearly confirms the rule that in
6
the Tenth Circuit, Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration. 6
Courts have also compelled arbitration to cases arising outside of the
securities industry, where there existed a direct agreement to arbitrate
between an employer and employee. Relying on Gilmer, a federal district
court in DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank of New York 67 compelled
Mary Lou DiCrisci to arbitrate her Title VII claim, pursuant to an
arbitration clause in her written employment contract. 61 Similarly, the
court in Scott v. Farm Family Life Insurance Co.,69 citing Gilmer, com-

9 U.S.C. § 1. In both this case and Gilmer, the arbitration clause was contained
in the employee's contract with a securities exchange, not with the employer ...
Courts should be mindful of this potential issue in future cases.
Id. at 230 n.l.
The Alford case made one further appearance before the Fifth Circuit. See Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). There the plaintiff argued that she had been
"fraudulently induced to enter into employment with Dean Witter and that the arbitration clauses
contained within the brokers registration agreements constitute[d] adhesion contracts." Id. at 1163.
The court, however, declined to address these issues since Alford had not raised them before the
trial court. Id.
61. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 1487.
63. Id. at 1485 (citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
64. Id. at 1485-86.
65. See id. at 1488-90.
66. Metz, of course, does not stand alone. A host of lower court decisions have followed Gilmer
and applied its holding to other statutes at issue in securities industry litigation. See Bompey &
Pappas, supra note 4, at 200 (citing Haviland v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 947 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom, J. Aron & Co. v. Haviland, 504 U.S. 930 (1992) (RICO); Bird v. Shearson
Lehman/Amer. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Saari v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992)
(Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act)). See also Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the ADEA was sufficiently like Title VII to compel arbitration of Title
VII claims, pursuant to Gilmer). Even Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995), where the court refused to compel arbitration based upon
lack of consent, nevertheless stated that Title VII claims are arbitrable. Id. at 1303.
67. 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
68. Id. at 949-50.
69. 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993).
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pelled arbitration pursuant to a clause in the employment contract of an
insurance agent.70
Hull v. NCR Corp.7' shows how Gilmer changed the law in the Eighth
Circuit. When Norma Hull, who had agreed to arbitration in a signed
at-will employment contract 72 sued for alleged violations of Title VII,
the district court had to address Eighth Circuit precedent which held
'7
that "Title VII and parallel state statutes were exempt from the FAA."
According to the court, the precedent in question, Swenson v. Management
Recruiters International,Inc. 74 relied heavily on Alexander.75 Because of
Gilmer's treatment of Alexander, however, the district court ruled that
Gilmer undermined Swenson, and declined to follow the Swenson court
of appeals holding. 76 Finding Title VII (at issue in Hull) and the ADEA
(at issue in Gilmer) "similar in their aims and their substantive provisions," ' 77 the Hull court compelled arbitration of Hull's claims. 71 Hull,
then, used Gilmer to squarely reverse the Eighth Circuit law of nonarbitrability of Title VII claims.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF UNILATERALLY IMPOSED
ARBITRATION
Courts have gone beyond compelling arbitration in situations where
an express agreement between an employer and employee exists. Following
the nation-wide trend that favors arbitration, in recent times courts have
compelled binding arbitration of statutory claims even when employers
unilaterally imposed such arbitration.
An early appearance of this issue was Mago v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton Inc. 79 Shearson acquired E.F. Hutton while Dana Mago was an
E.F. Hutton employee. 80 Mago subsequently completed an employment
application for Shearson which required the arbitration of "any controversy concerning compensation, employment or termination of employment with Shearson." 8 When Mago later filed a Title VII sexual harassment
and gender discrimination lawsuit, Shearson moved to compel arbitration
and stay the judicial proceedings.1 2 The trial court denied the motion,
and Shearson appealed under the FAA. 3

70. Id. A recent example of compelled arbitration in light of an employment contract is Maye
v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sexual harassment in derogation of Title

vil).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
See Hull, 826 F. Supp. at 305.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
Id.at 307.
956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 933.
Id. at 933-34.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 933.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, despite Mago's claims
that the arbitration clause was a contract of adhesion.8 4 The trial court
had not reached the factual underpinnings of the adhesion issue, ruling

as a matter of law. 8 Therefore, the court of appeals was not free to
86
decide the adhesion question and remanded for a factual determination.
The court noted, however, that Gilmer had left open the matter of

adhesion in an arbitration clause.8 7 In essence, the procedural posture of
Mago did not allow the Ninth Circuit to rule on the propriety of an
employer's unilateral imposition of an arbitration clause.8 8
A direct confrontation between unilaterally imposed arbitration and
statutory rights edged closer in a Minnesota federal district court a year
later. In Lang v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company8 9 the district
court compelled Larry Lang to arbitrate his tort claim of wrongful
termination. After hiring on with the railroad in 1965, Lang had received

promotions until he became a senior computer instructor, a non-union
exempt position. 9° Upon Lang's return from an approved medical leave
in 1992, Burlington terminated his employment as an instructor, effectively
also terminating his exempt status. 91 Exercising his seniority rights, Lang
returned to work in a lower paying post but sued Burlington, alleging
92
the wrongful termination of both his instructor position and his status.
In response, Burlington moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration clause announced to its employees and inserted in the railroad's
employee manual on January 1, 1991. 91
The court ruled in Burlington's favor, dismissing Lang's action without
prejudice.9 Lang had advanced that the arbitration clause, unilaterally

84. 1d. at 934-35. Presumably, adhesion entered this case through the employment application
that Shearson requested Mago to complete. Although Mago probably seamlessly made the transition
from being an E.F. Hutton employee to working for Shearson, not completing an application could
have resulted in her termination.
85. See id.
86. Mago, 956 F.2d at 934.
87. See id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25). The citation here is perplexing, since the court refers
to the part of Gilmer reasoning that discusses the scope of the FAA. Nevertheless, in Gilmer the
Supreme Court does address adhesion when it states:
There is no indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman,
was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration
application. As with the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed above, this claim
of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
88. The court of appeals left no doubt that absent adhesion, Shearson would have prevailed in
its motion to compel arbitration of Mago's Title VII claims. Citing pre-Gilmer law favorably
comparing the ADEA and Title VII, the court "conclude[d] that Mago ha[d] not met her burden
of showing that Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended to preclude arbitration of [Title VIII
claims .... " Mago, 956 F.2d at 935; accord Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544,
1554 (10th Cir. 1988).
89. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
90. Id. at 1105.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1107. The Court left open the possibility that Lang could come back to the court
if the arbitration should "prove unfair, dishonest, or a sham." Id. at 1106.
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imposed after he started work, was a contract of adhesion because it
left him "with only two options-to quit his job, or to maintain his
employment with the clause in place." 95 The court rejected that argument,
citing Gilmer for the proposition that mere inequality of bargaining power
will not invalidate arbitration agreements. 96 Sitting in diversity, the court
found "under Minnesota law that clear and definite policy language in
employee manuals may constitute a binding unilateral contract. ' 97 Such
contracts could only be void if unconscionable, and without elaborating
on Lang's adhesion claim, the court rejected the argument that Burlington
Northern's arbitration clause was inherently unfair. 98 The Lang court
expressly held that by continuing to work after Burlington had adopted
its arbitration agreement, Lang had supplied the necessary consideration,
in Minnesota, for the creation of a binding contract between him and
Burlington."
Where Lang left off, Kinnebrew v. Gulf Insurance Company'° continued, enforcing the unilaterally imposed binding arbitration of statutory
claims. Sharon Kinnebrew, a claims administrative manager who believed
that Gulf Insurance paid her less than her male predecessor, filed a
federal action alleging violation of the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act' 0' and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.102 Gulf successfully moved
for an order to compel arbitration. 0 3
Gulf prevailed despite its unilateral imposition of binding arbitration
as a condition of employment after Kinnebrew was hired.' °4 Gulf had
inserted its arbitration clause in the employee handbook, also mailing a
copy of the policy and an explanatory memorandum to each employee. 015
Kinnebrew urged the district court not to defer to the arbitration agreement, contending that it required her to forego substantive rights and
was not applicable to her without her express consent.' 6

95. Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1105.
96. Id. at 1106 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33).
97. Id. (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983)). In
Pine River State Bank, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a bank's distribution of an employee
handbook outlining termination procedures constituted an employment contract, despite the at-will
status of an employee. Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627. A linchpin of the holding was
that assuming an employee handbook formed an offer of employment conditions,
[t]he employee's retention of employment constitute[d] acceptance of the offer of
[the] unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave,
the employee supplie[d] the necessary consideration for the offer.
Id. at 627. Ironically, the Pine River State Bank decision, which was pro-employee, was persuasive
in the pro-employer Lang holding. See Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1106.
98. See Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1106. While the clause may not have been unfair, the, court
completely missed the thrust of Lang's argument. Lang objected not to the clause itself, but the
manner of its applicability to his case. Id. at 1105.
99. Id. at 1106.
100. CA No. 3:94-CV-1517-R, 1994 WL 803508 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
101. TEXAs CIVIL CODE § 5221k, repealed by Acts 1993, 73rd. Leg., ch. 269, § 5(1) (effective
Sept. 1, 1993).
102. Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508 at *1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *1, *2.
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The arbitration agreement at issue in Kinnebrew provided a prevailing
employee limited relief. The clause limited compensatory damages to
"direct injury as the arbitrator determines the party has suffered. ' 01 7 In
addition, reinstatement after termination was permissible only if money
damages proved an insufficient remedy.' °8 Moreover, the agreement precluded punitive damages, attorney's fees, and equitable relief.' °9 Clearly,
then, Gulf's arbitration agreement did not furnish Kinnebrew the same
remedies that she would enjoy under applicable statutes or equity. 110
Nevertheless, the court rejected all of Kinnebrew's claims. The court
first explicitly compared Kinnebrew's statutory claims with Title VII when
it cited Alford for the proposition that both the Texas and federal law
claims could be "subjected to compulsory arbitration.""' Next, the court
found that the arbitration procedure did not deprive Kinnebrew of her
substantive rights, stating that a substantive right was limited to the
"right to the equal enjoyment of fundamental rights, privileges, and
immunities, [as] distinguished from procedural rights."" 2 By separating
the right from the remedy, the court had no trouble finding that Kinnebrew
did "not forego 'substantive rights' when compelled to arbitrate under
a more limited remedial scheme, for Gulf's Arbitration Policy fully
protect[ed] Plaintiff's right to be free from discrimination."" 3 Next, the
court invoked the Gilmer presumption that statutory claims were arbitrable
unless Congress had "evinced an intention to preclude waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue,"''4 ruling that Kinnebrew had
not met her burden of showing such intentions." 5 The court then turned
its attention to Kinnebrew's coercion argument.
Kinnebrew also lost on her coercion claim. She had argued that Gulf's
imposition of the arbitration agreement, without explanation to or express
consent from employees, voided its applicability." 6 Citing Lang, and
without distinguishing possible differences between Texas and Minnesota
law," 7 the Texas court dismissed the adhesion claim because Kinnebrew

107. Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508 at *1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. There is precedent for arguing that by limiting relief in the arbitral forum, Gulf Insurance
left itself open to the possibility of court action for the rest of otherwise available remedies. In
Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd., 667 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court stated:
A party who consents to the inclusion in a contract of a limited arbitration clause
does not thereby waive his right to a judicial hearing on the merits of a dispute
not encompassed within the ambit of the clause.
Id. at 165. It would seem possible, therefore, to argue that an employer could have to defend an
action seeking in court the relief precluded by an arbitration clause. See also DiCrisci v. Lyndon
Guaranty Bank of New York, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
111. Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508 at *1 (citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991)). For a discussion of Alford, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
112. Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508 at *2 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1429 (6th ed. 1990)).
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id.(quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id.
117. Generally, the determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is made under state
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had "continued her employment after receiving a copy of the [a]rbitration
' The court buttressed its reasoning by relying on Fifth Circuit
[plolicy. ' ""
precedent for the proposition that the adhesion claim was an attack on

the arbitration contract as a whole, and therefore "subject to arbitration
itself.", 9
The Kinnebrew decision is remarkable for its implications. If courts
follow Kinnebrew, employers in Texas will be free to unilaterally insert

an arbitration agreement in an employee manual, significantly limit available statutory remedies, and prevail in the face of an employee judicial
challenge. Moreover, because of Kinnebrew's reliance on Alford, nothing
in current Fifth Circuit law prevents this scenario from applying to Title
VII claims. Even though Congress in 1991 strengthened Title VII's broad
remedial scheme by providing for compensatory damages and jury trials
in instances where none had been available before, 20 the current state
of case law could allow employers to take away Title VII claims from
a jury, contrary to the explicit intent of Congress.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The text and legislative history of the 1991 amendments show that
Congress wanted to provide claimants with the right to a jury trial where
a court, and not an arbitrator, would decide the issue of damages. A
great deal of effort went into the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, resulting in significant changes to discrimination law.' 2' Of particular
interest here, however, is the congressional decision to allow claimants
the right to seek compensatory and punitive damages, expressly providing
for jury trials. One of Congress's concerns was the inequity of allowing
compensatory and punitive damages for race discrimination under section

law. See Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d
42, 45 (2d. Cir. 1993) (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)). Thus, in Kinnebrew an
analysis of whether Texas law would have found the agreement to arbitrate to be a valid contract
would have been helpful.
118. Kinnebrew, 1994 WL 803508 at *2.
119. Id. (citing R.M. Perez & Assoc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1992)). In Kinnebrew,
the court misapplied the holding in R.M. Perez. R.M. Perez was a securities case alleging fraud
in securing customer and option agreements, which contained an arbitration clause. The court there
merely found that fraud, if any, related not only to the arbitration clause, but to the agreements
as a whole. Therefore, the court ruled that "the Federal Arbitration Act require[d] that the fraud
claim be decided by an arbitrator." R.M. Perez, 960 F.2d at 538 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
In Kinnebrew's case, her argument was essentially that she should not be deemed to have waived
her statutory rights and remedies. The court should have determined the waiver issue, rather than
deferring to the arbitral forum. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995); Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFLCIO v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972); Summer Rain v..Donning Co./Publishers,
964 F.2d 1455, 1459 (4th Cir. 1992); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 472 (lst Cir.
1989).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
121. See Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
54 LA. L. REv. 1459 (1994) (providing a concise summary of the negotiations leading to the 1991
amendments).
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1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, while precluding such relief
under Title VII for other discrimination claims. Accordingly, Congress
expressly wished to provide the same remedies to victims of gender and
religious discrimination as to victims of race discrimination.' 22 The House
Education and Labor Committee report on the 1991 amendments is replete
with evidence of Congress's intention to provide damages as a means of
making victims whole and of enforcing the statute.' 23 The committee also
mentioned deterrence as a legislative goal, 24 and discussed the need to
have victims of discrimination act as 'private attorneys general' by
enforcing the statute for the benefit of all Americans."' ' 25 Similarly, the
House Judiciary Committee intended the amendments to strengthen civil
rights remedies and to provide more effective deterrence against discrimination. 26 The Judiciary Committee echoed its sister panel in stating that
the 1991 amendments were an attempt to provide parity in remedies
27
where discrimination other than race exists.1
In section 118 of the 1991 amendments, Congress expressly included
language encouraging the arbitration of discrimination claims.' 28 This
122. H.R. REp. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 18, 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
553, 556, 602-03, 612 (report of the House Committee on Education and Labor) (stating that in
providing for damages the House of Representatives applied the "same standards courts have applied
under Section 1981").
123. The Education and Labor Committee discussed many cases of egregious discrimination where
courts could not award damages, and expressed multiple reasons for allowing damages:
Strengthening Title VII's remedial scheme to provide monetary damages for
intentional gender and religious discrimination is necessary to conform remedies for
intentional gender and religious discrimination to those currently available to victims
of intentional race discrimination. Monetary damages are also necessary to make
discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to' their mental
and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity. Such relief is also
necessary to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general to enforce the
statute. Monetary damages simply raise the cost of an employer's engaging in
intentional discrimination, thereby providing employers with additional incentives
to prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace before it happens.
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602-03 (emphasis added).
124. The Committee specifically referred to the pre-1991 back pay remedy as inadequate:
Making employers liable for all losses-economic and other wise-which are
incurred as a consequence of prohibited discrimination, and which are proved at
trial, will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both for
those held liable for damages as well as the employer community as a whole ....
Id. at 607 (citing Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986)).
Back pay as the exclusive monetary remedy under Title VII has not served as
an effective deterrent, and, when back pay is not available, as is the case where
a discrimination victim remains on-the-job or leaves the workplace for other reasons
other than discrimination, there is simply no deterrent.
Id. (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
125. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 617.
126. See H.R. REP. No. 40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694
(report of the House Committee on the Judiciary).
127. Id. at 717-23.
128. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Act or provisions of Federal law amended by this title.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
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clause could be construed as reinforcing the Gilmer presumption that
directs courts to compel arbitration, where Congress itself has not precluded arbitration in a statute providing a cause of action. 129 Yet there
is another, less simplistic, statutory analysis of the 1991 amendments.
On its face, the language of the amendments cautions against broadly
applying the Gilmer presumption. First, section 118 is not a mandate,
but an encouragement. While Congress would undoubtedly appreciate a
lessening of the burden on federal courts, Congress refused, by omission,
to compel arbitration under this section. Second, it would be absurd for
Congress to have created specific rights to jury trials and damages while
at the same time sanctioning unilaterally imposed arbitration schemes that
diminished those very remedies. A more harmonious interpretation of
the whole of the 1991 amendments shows that Congress intended for
arbitration and jury trials to co-exist, with the right to a jury trial, if
not paramount, then at least fully available to claimants.
In addition, the legislative history accompanying this section clearly
explains the congressional creation, without compromise, of a right to
a jury trial. In discussing section 118, both House committees stated that
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus,
for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or an employment contract, does not preclude
the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974). The Committee does not intend this section to be
used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available. 310
The committee reports do not mention Gilmer. Discussions in Congress
reveal, however, that individual members of the House knew of the
case. 3 ' It is telling, therefore, that those responsible for the Act chose
to highlight Alexander and ignore Gilmer. Moreover, the Education and
Labor Committee further elaborated on its opposition to arbitration
clauses imposed as a condition of employment. In addressing proposed
Republican minority substitute legislation to the 1991 House bill, the
Committee stated that the majority version of the legislation
includes a provision encouraging the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution to supplement, rather than supplant, the rights and remedies
provided by Title VII. The Republican substitute, however, encourages
the use of such mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution." Thus,
under the latter proposal employers could refuse to hire workers unless

129. See Bompey & Pappas, supra note 4, at 200.
130. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 97, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635 (report
of the House Committee on Education and Labor) (emphasis added). Compare with identical language
found in the report from the Judiciary Committee, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 735.
131. See 137 CoNG. REc. H9548 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII
complaints. Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court
decisions holding that workers have the right to go to court, rather
than being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important
statutory and constitutional rights, including employment opportunity
rights. American workers should
not be forced to choose between
32
their jobs and their civil rights.'
The House majority, then, did not intend for arbitration of Title VII
claims to preclude judicial remedies.
Finally, even arbitration's champions in Congress stopped short of
suggesting a Kinnebrew type result. The Republican minority was much
133
more supportive of arbitration than the Democrats in power at the time,
yet Republican legislators refused to endorse unilaterally imposed arbitration. The minority took pains to show that its version of the bill was
also protective of employee consent, where it specifically provided that
13 4
Of
any agreement to arbitrate must be "knowing and voluntary.1
course, under a Lang and Kinnebrew analysis, a court could construe a
unilaterally imposed arbitration clause as being knowing and voluntary
on the part of an employee. Such a construction, however, would seem
to go against the plain intent even of arbitration's earnest supporters in
Congress. Based on the language of the statute, as well as both the
majority and minority legislative history, courts should not give effect
to an employer's unilateral imposition of a binding arbitration clause
where Title VII rights are at issue.
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT EXCEPTION
Courts have not completely extended Gilmer to all statutory prohibitions
on discrimination; there is a reluctance to compel arbitration of Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims. A typical case is Riley v. Weyerhaeuser
Paper Co.,'
where the court denied compulsory arbitration, Gilmer
notwithstanding. 3 6 Weyerhaeuser had terminated Eldon Riley after he
was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and could not continue operating

132. H.R. REP. No. 40(l), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 642 (report
of the House Committee on Education and Labor) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
133. See id. The minority members of the Education and Labor Committee stated in the committee's
report:
Both H.R. 1375 [the minority version of the 1991 Civil Rights Act] and H.R.
1 [the House version] contain provisions for encouraging the use of alterative dispute
resolution mechanisms. Given the well-known litigation crisis pervading the judicial
system, which will be immeasurably worsened by H.R. 1, there is a desperate need
for greater use of [alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.]
H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 156, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 685.
134. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 156, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 685.
135. 898 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.C. 1995). The plaintiff in this case was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement; thus this case considered facts beyond the scope of this comment. It is
important to recognize, however, that in its reasoning the Riley court did not rely on Alexander's
distinction from Gilmer. Rather, the court stayed within the Gilmer language where Justice White,
speaking for the Court in Gilmer, recognized that "not all statutory claims may be appropriate for
arbitration." Riley, 898 F. Supp. at 326 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
136. Riley, 898 F. Supp. at 326-27.
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a rotary die cutter. 13 7 As a defense to Riley's lawsuit, Weyerhaeuser put
forth the mandatory arbitration procedures of the controlling collective
The court ruled against Weyerhaeuser, relying
bargaining agreement.'
on the language in Gilmer that left open the possibility of showing
Congress's. intent to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum. 3 9 The court
found the necessary intent in the legislative history of the ADA:
While the text of the [ADA) statute in [42 U.S.C.] § 12112 does
encourage the use of alternative means of dispute resolution where
appropriate, including arbitration, the legislative history of the Act
is unequivocal in expressing Congress's intent to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies. 40

Other decisions have addressed the relationship between compulsory arbitration and the ADA. For example, the Block v. Art Iron, Inc. 141 court
found that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial remedies under
the ADA. 142 More recently, in the Sixth Circuit, an Ohio federal court
143
followed Block in refusing to compel arbitration of an ADA claim.
For ADA claims, then, federal courts hesitate to extend Gilmer and
enforce binding arbitration agreements.
Such hesitation should also apply to post-1991 Title VII claims, particularly where an employer has acted coercively by unilaterally imposing
arbitration, since the reasoning with respect to ADA claims is fully
applicable to Title VII claims. The ADA legislative history referred to

Riley, 898 F. Supp. at 326.
Id.
See id. In finding that the burden was on Gilmer to show Congress's intent to prevent a
of statutory remedies, the Gilmer Court stated:
Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, "[h]aving
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). This quote goes to the heart of this comment's argument. Federal courts
now allow the unilateral imposition of arbitration of Title VII claims. This is doubly wrong in
light of Gilmer, both because the 1991 amendments to Title VII provide for the right to a jury
trial, and because such unilateral imposition is coercive. Therefore, an employee has not "made
the bargain to arbitrate."
140. Riley, 898 F. Supp. at 326-27 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500 (report of the House Committee on the Judiciary)).
In analyzing similar provisions of the ADA and Title VII, it is important to note that in examining
the ADA's legislative history, the Riley court did not rely on the even stronger language found in
the second House Conference Report on the ADA, where the language of the Committee of
Conference unequivocally rejected mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 596, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 598.
141. 866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
142. Id. at 386 (stating that "the ADA's legislative history very strongly suggests that ADA claims
may not be arbitrated in the absence of an express, voluntary waiver of the right to assert the
claim in the courts").
143. DiPuccio v. United Parcel Serv., 890 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ohio 1995). There is no doubt
that an important component of both this case and Block was the fact that the employees in both
were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the language of each opinion with
respect to the ADA is broad enough to support the proposition put forth here regarding the ADA's
relationship to arbitration.

137.
138.
139.
waiver
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in Riley contains strikingly similar language to the committee reports for
the Title VII amendments. 144 Or rather, the 1991 Title VII amendments
are similar to the ADA in their views of arbitration, since the ADA
became law in 1990.145 The close relationship between the ADA and the
1991 Title VII amendments show that Congress took the same approach
to examining the arbitration issue. Congress intertwined the remedies
available under both measures,'" and courts should adjudicate those rights
consistently, while at the same time respecting the will of the legislature.
Yet under current jurisprudence, an employee discriminated against on
the basis of a disability can get a jury trial, while an employee discriminated for other, non race-related reasons cannot, particularly if an
employer requires the signing of an arbitration agreement before a prospective employee can start working. As the 1991 legislation shows, there

are no grounds for the dichotomy in the approaches to arbitration that
courts have taken. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, just as much as the ADA,
expresses Congress' intent to encourage, but not enforce, arbitration.
RECENT DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE 1991 AMENDMENTS
Courts ruling on pre-1991 claims established precedents for post-1991
holdings which hinder a clearer appreciation of the 1991 legislative changes.
Several circuits expressly recognize that compulsory arbitration is allowable
under pre-1991 Title VII.147 Accordingly, it would be difficult for a court
to rule that the 1991 Civil Rights Act, seen merely as an amendment to

144. The House Committee on the Judiciary, reporting on the Alternated Dispute Resolution
provision of the ADA, section 513, stated:
The Committee adopted this section during its consideration of the bill. This
section encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law. These methods include settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, mini-trials and arbitration.
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution
that are already authorized by law. The Committee wishes to emphasize, however,
that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement,
not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for example, the Committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does
not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions
of this Act.
H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499500. Compare with the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, supra notes 120-135, and
accompanying text.
145. President Bush signed the ADA on July 26, 1990. 26 Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documenis 1165, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601-02.
146. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly extends the availability of compensatory and punitive
damages, as well as jury trials, to actions under the ADA. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 107273.
147. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939
F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Title VII, precludes compulsory arbitration.'4 This reasoning prevails
despite the fact that most decisions creating stare decisis and favoring
arbitration of Title VII claims were either handed down before the 1991
amendments applied 49 or followed Alford without considering the 1991
amendments.1 5° Courts have recently spoken to the issue of whether
Congress, in including provisions for damages and jury trials in the 1991
Civil Rights Act, intended to protect claimants against waiver of the
right to a judicial forum. 5'
The extensive committee reports discussing new rights to damages and
jury trials under the 1991 amendments failed to convince courts to
distinguish cases arising under the legislation. In several federal and state
opinions, courts to date have steadfastly held that in enacting the 1991
Civil Rights Act, Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made a passing reference to
section 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act in a case involving arbitration
of Title VII claims under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 5 2 The extent
of the court's comment, in ruling that the plaintiff was required to
arbitrate her employment related dispute under the RLA, noted that
"[section] 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including arbitration, to resolve disputes arising under Title VII."'
New York's highest court came to the same conclusion, albeit giving
section 118 more attention. In Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. , 4 the
court examined the familiar arbitration clause of the securities industry,
where two plaintiffs had sued their respective employers under New York's
State Human Rights Law, one claiming race, and the other gender-based,
discrimination.' 5 5 Both defendants responded by seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA. 5 6 When the cases reached the court of appeals,
the court mandated arbitration, extensively discussing the 1991 amendments.
Speaking through Judge Titone, the majority first analogized the state
law claims with federal law"5 7 and then discussed Title VII, concluding

148. Indeed, although a few lower courts have been inclined to see in the 1991 amendments'
legislative history sufficient language to prevent court-ordered arbitration, appellate courts have not
agreed. See infra notes 165-174 and accompanying text.
149. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 500 U.S. 930 (1991), was decided on August 2, 1991.
150. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487.
151. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
152. Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
114 S. Ct. 2732 (1994).
153. Id. at 1146. There is not clear indication from this opinion or the ruling on this case in
the district court, Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1062 (W.D. Tex. 1992), if
Hirras's claims arose before the enactment of the 1991 amendments. Given the dates of the opinions,
this is likely to be the case. Note, however, that when the court ruled in Hirras, the Supreme Court
had not yet held that the 1991 amendments did not apply retroactively. See Rivers v. Roadway
Express, 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
154. 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993).
155. Id. at 1000-01.
156. Id.
157. The Fletcher court applied the Gilmer ruling to New York case law, holding that a 1979
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that "there is nothing in the legislative history of either that Federal
statute itself or the recently adopted amendments to that statute ...
that would suggest the existence of a congressional intent to override the

general rule that anticipatory contracts to arbitrate are enforceable under
the FAA."' 58 In that legislative history, the court looked to the statement
of Congressman Edwards, cosponsor of section 118, recognizing the intent
there to preclude enforced arbitration of Title VII claims, yet also finding
that one individual's statement could not evince congressional intent.
Similarly, the court refused to read into the amendments' committee

reports Congress' intention to forbid courts to compel mandatory ar-

bitration of statutory claims. 5 9 Judge Smith wrote a lengthy dissent in
Fletcher, focusing the argument both on the race discrimination at issue
and on the continued vitality of Alexander. 60 The dissent found that the
1991 legislative history showed Congress' intent "to preclude the com-

decision disfavoring arbitration of discrimination claims would no longer be followed. Id. (citing
Matter of Wertheim & Co. v. Halpert, 397 N.E.2d 386 (1979)). The court then explained that
[wihere the [asserted] right is predicated on a State or local statute rather than on
a congressional enactment, it is undisputed ... that the courts are obliged to draw
an analogy to the equivalent Federal law, where possible, and to consider Congress'
intentions with regard to the rights created by that law.
Fletcher, 619 N.E.2d at 1002.
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. The court devoted much space to this question. The majority's reasoning regarding section 118
stated:
The amendment that the dissent cites, which authorizes the use of alternative
dispute resolution methods for controversies arising under Title VII ... merely
adds to the existing, statutorily created right to seek relief in judicial and administrative forums . . . That amendment does not shed any light on Congress' intentions
with regard to anticipatory agreements to use arbitral forums in the event of a
future dispute. It is true that the amendment's cosponsor, Congressman Edwards,
stated in the Congressional Record that the amendment was "intended to be
consistent with decisions such as [Alexander], which protect employees from being
required to agree in advance to arbitrate disputes" and that "[n]o approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gilmer . . . or any
application or extension of it." However, this statement cannot be viewed as
indicative of the intentions of Congress as a whole, since it expresses only the
position of the individual legislator who made it.
Similarly, the [two House reports] on which the plaintiff ... relies, are not
useful indicators of congressional intent with regard to the enforceability of arbitration contracts in Title VII disputes. While those reports have more persuasive
value than do Representative Edwards' personal remarks in terms of their ability
to reflect Congress' intent, they are not particularly helpful to plaintiffs' position
here, because they merely set forth the committees' understanding of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in discrimination disputes under the then-existing
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, the section of the committee report on which
the dissent relies states only that the committee "believes that any agreement to
submit disputed issues to arbitration ... does not preclude the affected person
This
from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII ....
section, of course, says nothing about what Congress actually intended.
Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 (N.Y. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 554 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). While the author agrees with the Fletcher
court's position regarding the statement of Congressman Edwards, the author finds the court's
analysis of the committee reports to be remarkably short-sighted. Read as a whole, the reports
clearly show congressional intent to provide not only for damages in Title VII actions, but for jury
trials as well.
160. Id. at 1006-12.
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pulsory arbitration of racial discrimination claims.' ' 6' In addition, the
dissent, in no uncertain terms, stated that an arbitration clause offered
as a condition of employment was coercive. 62 As case law has repeatedly
showed, however, Judge Smith is in the minority on this issue.
Other courts that have considered the issue have reached the same
conclusion as the Fletcher majority. A Kansas federal court followed
Fletcher in another securities industry case where the plaintiff alleged sex
discrimination and harassment. 63 In ordering a stay of the proceedings
pursuant to an arbitration clause in a standard U-4 form,'6 the court
looked no further than the "plain language" of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. With an eye on Fletcher, it rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the "committee report[s are] sufficient to establish Congressional intent
to preclude a waiver of judicial remed[ies] in Title VII cases."' 65 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals likewise refused a similar argument
in Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth.' 66 The trial judge in
Benefits Communications had specifically found that the legislative history
of the 1991 amendments showed Congress' intent to overrule the Gilmer
holding, 167 but the court of appeals, guiding itself only with the statutory
text, reversed. 68 To date, not a single appellate court has upheld a lower
court's decision that the 1991 amendments barred the enforcement of
arbitration clauses where Title VII rights were at issue.

161. Id. at 1010.
162. The dissent criticized the majority's reading of the 1991 committee reports:
The majority's decision sanctions the involuntary waiver of the statutory right to
judicial review of a claim of racial discrimination. The waiver is involuntary because
it is a condition of employment-failure to register [with stock exchanges] precludes
one from being a representative and registration requires agreement to arbitrate
disputes with the employer. There is no negotiation of this term. Refusal means
exclusion from the industry. Thus, this case arguably comes within the statement
in Gilmer that "courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds" for revoking a contract [citations omitted].
The involuntariness of this waiver is highlighted by the fact that it is prospective.
Id. at 1011. The dissent here seems to buttress its coercion argument by stating that refusal to sign
a registration/arbitration agreement not only precludes one from being hired, but it precludes one
from working in the securities industry altogether.
163. Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-2418-GTV, 1994 WL 34870 (D.
Kan. Jan. 25, 1994).
164. The U-4 form is an industry-wide standard form, which an employee signs when he or she
registers with the New York Stock Exchange. The form contains an arbitration clause where the
employee agrees to "arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and
my firm," id. at *1, and is at issue in most, if not all, arbitration cases within the securities
industry.
165. Id. at *4.
166. 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C. 1994).
167. Id. at 1301.
168. Id. at 1305. Arguably, much of the court's discussion is dictum, since the plaintiff only
sued under the district's Human Rights Act, and not Title VII. But because as in New York,
District of Columbia courts look to federal precedents for substantive guidance, and because both
the lower and appellate courts in Benefits Communication based their rulings and reasonings on
federal law, this opinion is highly significant as to the Title VII issue.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals examined precisely this question
in Hurst v. PrudentialSecurities Inc. 16 9 There Jeana Hurst had sued her
employer, Prudential-Bache Capital Funding, alleging Title VII, Equal
Pact Act, and RICO violations. 170 After procedural motions naming
Prudential Securities, with which Hurst had signed a standard arbitration7
agreement, as a defendant, Prudential moved to compel arbitration. '
The trial court initially denied the motion on the grounds that Prudential
had waived its right to arbitrate. 72 In ruling on Prudential's motion for
a stay pending appeal, the court added, among other reasons for denying
the arbitration defense, that "the 1991 amendments to Title VII express
a preference for the judicial forum.' 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
constrained by Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,' 7 4 and unperdictated a different result than previous
suaded that the 1991 amendments
75
Title VII arbitration cases.
While the judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements presented as
pre-hiring conditions of employment seems firmly entrenched, a closelywatched Ninth Circuit decision indicates that a court was willing to strike
down arbitration clauses where employees did not consent to such arbitration prior to starting work. Two employees in PrudentialInsurance
Co. of America v. Lai, 76 Justine Lai and Elvira Viernes, sued the
Prudential Company in state court, alleging rape by a supervisor, harassment, and sexual abuse. 77 Prudential sought relief in federal court,
attempting to compel arbitration under a U-4 form that both plaintiffs
78
had signed. The federal court ordered the case to proceed to arbitration.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, focusing on the 1991 amendments
to Title VII and their legislative history.
The central issue on appeal was whether Lai and Viernes, in signing
the U-4 form when applying for work, had voluntarily consented to
arbitration of statutory claims. The court accepted the plaintiffs' allegations that Prudential had not informed them of the U-4 forms' significance, or even given them an opportunity to read the forms.79 Expressly
acknowledging that it was not revisiting Mago, the court explained the
focus of its inquiry:

169. No. 93-15148, 1994 WL 118097 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 1994). Hurst is an unpublished disposition
which under Circuit Rule 36-3 is not precedential. Nevertheless, Hurst is worth discussing both
because it is a case on point and because it illustrates the thinking of some of the judges of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
170. Id. at *1.
171. Id.at *1, *2.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id.
174. 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
175. Hurst, 1994 WL 118097, at *3, *6. The court refused to distinguish either Gilmer or Mago,
and relegated to a footnote, albeit a long one, its discussion of the 1991 amendments. See id. at
*6 n.2.
176. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995).
177. Id. at 1301.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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The issue before us, however, is not whether employees may ever
agree to arbitrate statutory employment claims; they can. The issue
here is whether these particular employees entered into such a binding
arbitration agreement, thereby waiving statutory court remedies otherwise available. 80
Yet while presenting the issue in contract terms, the court did not limit

its analysis to contract law.
The Lai court, influenced by the policies underlying Title VII, declined
to enforce arbitration under the circumstances. Although Gilmer directed
courts to examine whether Congress had precluded arbitration of statutory
claims, the Ninth Circuit reached to Alexander, combined with the 1991

amendments and their legislative history, in discussing consensual waiver.
The court first cited the' Alexander language supporting multiple remedies
for Title VII injuries.
Next, the court found that section 118 of the

1991 amendments and its legislative history, including a committee report
and a statement by Senator Dole, stood for the proposition that Congress
encouraged arbitration "only 'where the parties knowingly and voluntarily
elect[ed] to use these methods."" '1 s2 The court discussed at length its

understanding of the voluntary consent requirement:
This congressional concern that Title VII disputes be arbitrated only
"where appropriate," and only when such a procedure was knowingly
accepted, reflects our public policy of protecting victims of sexual
discrimination and harassment through the provisions of Title VII
and analogous state statutes. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47. This is
a policy that is at least as strong as our public policy in favor of
arbitration. Although the Supreme Court has pointed out that plaintiffs
who arbitrate their statutory claims do not "forego the substantive
rights afforded by statute," Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628, the
remedies and procedural protections available in the arbitral forum
can differ significantly from those contemplated by the legislature.
In the sexual harassment context, these procedural protections may
be particularly significant. Thus, we conclude that a Title VII plaintiff
may only be forced to forego her statutory remedies and arbitrate
her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to
arbitration." 3
Although the court could have rested its ruling strictly on a contract
principle of lack of consent,' 8 4 the court reasoned broadly, choosing to

180. Id. at 1303.
181. Id. at 1304 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974)).
182. Id. at 1304-05, (citing 137 CONG. REc. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Dole).
183. Id. at 1305 (footnote omitted). The court took note that under California law, privacy rights
of victims of sexual harassment are protected by discovery-limiting statutes, and that "in an area
as personal and emotionally charged as sexual harassment and discrimination, the procedural right
to a hearing before a jury of one's peers, rather than a panel of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, may be especially important." Id.
184. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (stating that arbitration agreements are on the same footing
as other contracts).
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weigh the public policies supporting Title VII and arbitration and finding
that in this instance, Title VII policies prevailed, because the parties,
even if they were "aware of the nature of the U-4 form . . . could not
have understood that in signing it, they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual
discrimination suits.'"85
The Lai decision, while broad in its reasoning and seemingly supportive
of resolution of Title VII claims in a judicial forum, nevertheless has a
narrow holding, limited to the employee's lack of consent at the time
of signing U-4 forms. 8 6 For this reason, Lai does not directly preclude
a Kinnebrew-type result, where an employer would unilaterally impose
an arbitration clause, describing in detail the possible claims at issue,
and then argue that the employee's continuation of work represented
knowing consent. Lai does show, however, that at least one federal circuit
is concerned about forcing employees into giving up a judicial forum,
particularly for Title VII claims.
THE CURRENT STATE OF TITLE VII ARBITRATION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has likewise
looked with disfavor on mandatory arbitration clauses. EEOC commissioner Paul Miller has recently gone on record stating that while the
agency favors arbitration,
[tihe problem is mandatory arbitration clauses that are imposed on
employees as a condition of employment or continuing employment.
We basically see these as ways to circumvent a party's right to file
in federal court and their civil rights as set out by Congress. 8 7
The EEOC successfully sought an injunction, early in 1995, against River
Oaks Imaging and Diagnostics, a Houston company that had wanted to
unilaterally implement a binding arbitration clause and conditioned continued employment upon each employee's acceptance of the clause.' 8 In
two other cases, the EEOC has filed amicus briefs, urging courts to
decline to enforce arbitration clauses.
The EEOC amicus brief in Duffield v. Robertson Stevens & Company"s9
best exemplifies the agency's position, focusing on both the arbitration

185. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
186. It is interesting to note that in an earlier arbitration decision, Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc.,
25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994), the court squarely held, in response
to the claim that the 1991 amendments to Title VII provided for a jury trial, that "establishing a
right to jury trial for Title VII claims does not evince a congressional intent to preclude arbitration;
it merely defines those procedures which are available to plaintiffs who pursue the federal option,
as opposed to arbitration." Id. at 1441. Note that the court in Nghiem was perhaps less willing
to discuss the issue because the employee had initiated arbitration, fully participated, and came to
court when dissatisfied with the results. Id. at 1440.
187. Margaret A. Jacobs, Firms with Policies Requiring Arbitration Are Facing Obstacles, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5.
188. Richard C. Reuben, Two Agencies Review Forced Arbitration, A.B.A. JOURNAL, August
1995, at 26. See also United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. River Oaks Imaging
& Diagnostic, No. CIV.A.H-95-75, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
189. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of the Equal Opportunity Commission as Amicus
Curiae, Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., No. C-95-0109-EFL (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 4, 1995)
[hereinafter Memorandum].
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clause at issue and its imposition on an employee. In its brief, the EEOC
urged the court to deny an employer's motion to compel arbitration. 19
Tonya Duffield sued Robertson Stevens, alleging Title VII violations
involving denial of partnership on the basis of sex, sexual harassment,
and retaliation. The EEOC argued two main points. First, the agency
maintained that Robertson Stevens' requirement that Duffield sign a U4 form was presented as a non-negotiable "take it or leave it" basis,
thus constituting a contract of adhesion.' 91 The EEOC's second argument
is that the arbitration clause is unfair because under it arbitration pursuant
to NASD and NYSE
(1) is not governed by the statutory requirements and standards of
Title VII; (2) is conducted by arbitrators given no training and possessing no expertise in employment law; (3) routinely does not permit
plaintiffs to receive punitive damages and attorneys' fees to which
they would otherwise be entitled under the statute; and (4) forces
them to pay exorbitant "forum fees" in the tens of thousands of92
dollars, greatly discouraging aggrieved employees from seeking relief.
Nevertheless, for all its opposition to arbitration in this case, the EEOC
makes it quite clear at the outset that it encourages arbitration of labor
disputes. Essential to the agency, however, is the need for arbitration to
be fair and voluntary, while safeguarding statutory rights. 93
Under the latest decisions addressing compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims, it appears possible that employers can completely divest
employees of the explicitly granted congressional right to a judicial forum,
and with it a jury trial. Even Lai's seemingly anti-arbitration holding
does not prevent the post-employment imposition of compulsory binding
arbitration, so long as employers are careful to fully notify all their
workers, and document such notification. Indeed, Lai teaches that only
informed consent to sign a U-4 form stood in the way of the enforcement

190.
191.
1965)).
192.
193.

See id.
Id. at 5 (citing Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 385 n.5 (9th Cir.

Id. at 3.
The Memorandum brief could not have been clearer in expressing the agency's position:
The Commission strongly favors the voluntary use of arbitration and other forms
of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), and believes that properly used it can
speed and simplify the process of adjudicating discrimination claims. However,
arbitration that is not knowing and voluntary deprives individuals of substantial
rights provided by Congress, especially where-as alleged here-the procedures are
unfair and specifically designed not to safeguard statutory rights. Rather than
improving the system, improper use of arbitration impairs it.
Memorandum at 1.
Certain states may protect statutory rights independently of federal laws. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that the state's Wage Claim Act voids any agreement that restricts an
employee's right to sue for the recovery of wages. See Lambdin v. District Court of Arapahoe
County, 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995).
Likewise, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is critical of arbitration clauses imposed
as a condition of continued employment. The NLRB filed unfair labor charges against an employer
who had fired an employee for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement. See Reuben, supra note
188; Jacobs, supra note 187.

Summer 1996]

EMPLOYEE STATUTORY RIGHTS

of arbitration of civil remedies for claims of rape, harassment, and sexual
abuse. While arbitration is theoretically not an inferior forum for Title

VII claims, the fact remains, that out of many cases in this active area
of the law, research has uncovered only very few instances where it was

an employee, and not an employer, who sought arbitration in a Title
VII action. ,94
The reason is simple: employers prefer to keep Title VII claims from
juries. Employers, as dominant parties in conflict with individual employees, gain by preferring arbitration. 95 There is little doubt that employers find arbitration more favorable than jury trials. For example,
one commentator states that employers "stand a greater chance of success
in arbitration rather than in court before a jury."' 9 Arbitration awards
are usually smaller than jury awards, and often do not include attorneys'

fees. 197 In some instances, arbitrators are limited in the remedies they

can provide.1 98 Indeed, two management lawyers candidly admit that
"[a]rbitration may be particularly desirable now that all employment
discrimination plaintiffs are entitled by federal statute to a jury trial if

the claim is filed in court."'

99

CONCLUSION
Because of the judicial forum's inherent ability to level the playing
field in disputes between employers and employees, it is unfortunate that
Congress has not seen fit to overturn Gilmer in explicit terms. Courts
should not compound the injury of congressional inaction with the insult
of allowing employers to coerce employees into foregoing important
statutory employment rights. Title VII and its amendments are at the
core of equal protection in our society, and the courts should diligently

194. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638
(1994).
195. For a thorough discussion of the advantages that arbitration offers dominant parties, as well
as a cogent explanation of the superiority of litigation as a tool of social change, see Whittaker,
supra note 31, at 306-11. In the civil rights context, litigation is an excellent mechanism for leveling
the bargaining position of the parties. Id. at 322-23. Indeed,
arbitration's simplicity, far from compensating victims [of civil rights violations]
for its shortcomings, is yet another shortcoming. It is mostly the alleged wrongdoers
are pleased [sic] by the decreased cost, time, and formality of the arbitral proceedings.
Victims need the additional power that the cost and complexity of litigation give
them.
Whittaker, supra note 31, at 322-23.
One commentator's greatest concern is that arbitration, by virtue of its private nature, prevents
the development of employment and discrimination law at the appellate level:
[I]t is the privacy and finality aspects of arbitration that are most troubling, rather
than the neutrality or competency aspects. Such a systematic consequence may be
desirable in the world of commercial relationships and securities investors, but may
not be desirable for employer-employee relations.
Gray, supra note 1, at 134.
196. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 4, at 208.
197. Id. at 208, 211.
198. Id. at 208. See also Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 94-CV-1517R, 1994 WL 803508 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 28, 1994), supra notes 100-119 and accompanying text.
199. Bompey & Pappas, supra note 4, at 211.
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exercise their responsibility to protect those democratically created rights.
Perhaps Lai, which the Supreme Court declined to review, is the first
step toward re-establishing a proper balance between employer and employee rights. However, a troubling possibility is that the reasoning of
Kinnebrew will continue to prevail in federal courts, despite the opposition
of the EEOC and the NLRB. Courts must guard against the erosion of
statutory rights, and while encouraging arbitration, see to it that such
arbitration is both fair and non-coercive. Most importantly, courts should
not force employees to abandon their right to a jury trial of Title VII
claims.
PIERRE LEVY

